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February 19 2020

Holy controversy over proposal to mention God in Russia's constitution

The patriarch's proposal to mention God in the preamble of the new constitution has divided Russian commentators. Their debate is less about belief in the Almighty — and more about faith in the state.

February 18 2020

North America has mustangs, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the wild horses of Livno

A herd of horses released in the wild decades ago has been thriving in the mountains near the city of Livno in the South of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Japan edges ever closer to a COVID-19 epidemic

As a ship with 454 infected passengers remains quarantined at berth in Yokohama, the likelihood of a potential epidemic within Japan has slowly started to sink in.

*Migration de retour vers la Côte d'Ivoire*

Migration de retour vers la Côte d’Ivoire

Life on the margins: The Lyuli people of Uzbekistan

Aleksandr Barkovsky, a photographer who has worked with the community, says that ordinary Uzbeks still know little to nothing about their Lyuli neighbours.

"Worth the Price?" New Film Shows How Biden Played Leading Role in Push for U.S. to Invade Iraq

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The Democratic presidential candidates face off in Las Vegas Wednesday night ahead of the Nevada caucuses. Nevada could be a decisive state for candidates who performed poorly in Iowa and New Hampshire, including former Vice President Joe Biden. As Biden hopes for a comeback, a new short documentary sheds light on his extensive role in the Iraq War — an issue that has been raised repeatedly on the campaign trail. Biden has apologized for supporting the war, but the new film, directed by the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s Mark Weisbrot, exposes Biden’s central role in pushing for an Iraq invasion. It’s called “Worth the Price? Joe Biden and the Launch of the Iraq War.” The documentary is narrated by Danny Glover.

Wärme aus dem See

Die Schweizer Seen kühlen auch im tiefsten Winter meist nicht unter fünf Grad ab. Mehrere Versorger wollen diese Wärme nutzen, um Stadtquartiere zu beheizen. Das Konzept ist klimafreundlich – aber teuer.

Journalist: Harvey Weinstein's Defense Team Is Waging a War Against the #MeToo Movement

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A jury of seven men and five women meet today in New York Supreme Court to begin deliberations on whether to find disgraced movie mogul Harvey Weinstein guilty of sexual assault. The case has drawn international attention amid the #MeToo movement. If the jurors find Weinstein guilty, he faces a maximum sentence of life in prison. Weinstein has been accused of sexual misconduct by more than 100 women but in this case faces five charges based on evidence relating to two main accusers. One woman, who wishes to remain anonymous, alleges she was raped by Weinstein in a New York hotel, for which he has been charged with rape in the first and third degrees. The second main accuser is former “Project Runway” production assistant Miriam Haley, who alleges Weinstein forced oral sex on her in 2006. For this, Weinstein faces a count of criminal sex act. If the jury finds Weinstein guilty of the charges relating to either or both of the main accusers, then it can consider two counts of predatory sexual assault against him. We speak with Irin Carmon, a senior correspondent for New York magazine who has followed the allegations against Harvey Weinstein. She spoke with 21 of his accusers in her article “100 Women vs. Harvey Weinstein” and wrote about a 57-page PowerPoint Harvey Weinstein’s team sent to reporters that smeared his alleged victims. Her new piece is headlined “The Woman Who Taped Harvey Weinstein.”

Ambra Gutierrez Recorded Harvey Weinstein Admitting Sexual Assault in 2015. Why Wasn't He Charged?

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Irin Carmon is a senior correspondent for New York magazine who has followed the allegations against Harvey Weinstein. She just published her new profile on Ambra Battilana Gutierrez, a Filipina-Italian model who reported Weinstein to the New York Police Department in 2015 for allegedly groping her during a meeting at his Tribeca office. At the urging of police, she wore a recording device for an arranged meetup at a Manhattan hotel and got Weinstein to admit on tape that he groped her and sought unsuccessfully to get her to come to his room. Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance decided not to pursue the case and said “a criminal charge is not supported.” Carmon’s article is headlined “The Woman Who Taped Harvey Weinstein.”

For Rohingya refugees, ID systems have brought coercion, violence and denial of ethnic identity

In Bangladesh, ‘Smart Cards’ have become essential for refugees’ survival.

A Rohingya woman from Myanmar holds a SweTinSit photo. Seven of the people pictured were killed in military “clearance operations’’ in northern Rakhine state in August 2017. Photo courtesy of Shafiur Rahman.

Taslima was dreading the day. It was SweTinSit, an annual population census conducted by Myanmar government officials in northern Rakhine state. Military, police and customs officials would be sweeping through, collecting data on Rohingya families – monitoring the birth of children, photographing family members and listing their names. This was in 2016, when tensions in Rakhine were escalating.

For many Rohingya people, like Taslima and others in her village of Tula Toli, the SweTinSit (or “Map Record Check,” in Burmese) was a mandatory and intense audit, and always unpredictable. If one is absent during a SweTinSit, their relatives can be subject to extortion, imprisonment, arbitrary taxation, or worse. The year before, a relative of Taslima's was raped by a military officer.

In the SweTinSit of 2016, Taslima's brother-in-law had gone to work outside the village, to repay a debt. Fearing that he would be arrested for his brother's absence, Taslima's husband disappeared for the three days it took for the census to be completed in Tula Toli. Taslima paid a fine of 300,000 kyats (US $208) for her brother-in-law and a further fine of 200,000 kyats (US $138) for her husband.

Officers warned her that if her husband did not return while the census was still underway, there would be further consequences. In the early hours of the very next day, Taslima says that four men, including the village chairman Aung Ko Sein, entered her hut and raped her in front of her two young children.

From SweTinSit in Myanmar to ‘Smart Cards’ in Bangladesh

I met and interviewed Taslima in 2018, after she, along with hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims like herself, had fled from Rakhine state to Bangladesh.

At this time, the lists and the photographs produced during SweTinSit amounted to the only forms of official Myanmar government documentation that many of them had. Authorities do not grant citizenship to Rohingya people born in Myanmar territory. In government documentation systems and rhetoric, Rohingya are referred to as “Bengalis,” erroneously suggesting that they are migrants from Bangladesh.

In Bangladesh, photos and lists from SweTinSit have become portable memories of loved ones, thousands of whom perished in the so-called “Clearance operations.” These documents also are potentially the most compelling claim to citizenship that Rohingya refugees possess, given that many of these records stretch back decades.

Once they had arrived in Bangladesh, at the Balukhali camp, Taslima learned that her household family members would need to register with camp authorities in order to receive food tokens. To register, Taslima and her family members were told to submit their information, fingerprints, and an iris scan, all of which would be collected and logged in biometric “Smart Cards.”

Speaking with others in the camp, Taslima and her husband heard different views on the Smart Cards. But concerns grew stronger, and the opposition to Smart Cards germinated and spread. Many refugees refused to believe that the card was just a practical necessity for aid management and delivery, that it had no social or political meaning.

On Twitter, the head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi called the Smart Card a “personal document which is also a tangible sign of dignity and hope.” But many Rohingya disagreed. At the heart of their suspicion lay the fact that the cards did not include the word “Rohingya,” although the database for the Smart Cards does include this information. The card itself describes Rohingya cardholders as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals.”

What's in a name?

One might imagine that to be called a “Myanmar National” would be favourable for many Rohingya, who for decades have struggled against the Myanmar government’s refusal to grant them citizenship.

Nay San Lwin, a prominent Rohingya activist and coordinator of the diaspora group Free Rohingya Coalition, told me:

It is not standard practice [to include one's ethnicity on an ID card]. But the people in the camps felt very strongly about their ethnic name given their experience of being labelled “Bengali” in Myanmar. They wanted to secure their Rohingya identity on a card finally. They thought it would amount to some international recognition of Rohingya ethnic identity.

And for many, the decision not to include the term “Rohingya” indicated deeper collaboration between the Bangladeshi and Myanmar governments.

After you register, who can access your data?

For many, an even more worrisome aspect of the process was that the database registration form included the option to share one’s information with Myanmar authorities. This suggested that Smart Card biometric information would be shared with Myanmar for repatriation, an abiding goal of the Bangladesh government for over four decades.

Many feared that data from the Smart Cards would be integrated into the Myanmar government's National Verification Card system, a failed attempt (separate from the SweTinSit process) to register Rohingyas as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh formally. The registration form included a question, “when did you arrive in Myanmar and by which route,” with the answer often pre-filled. For Rohingya people, NVC cards marked them as foreigners and deprived them of their rightful status as citizens of Myanmar. They even termed it the “genocide card.” Except for those who were coerced to do so, Rohingya people refused to register for the card.

Within six months of the August 2017 influx of over 700,000 Rohingya people into Bangladesh, Myanmar dispatched its Social Welfare Minister, Dr. Win Myat Aye, to the camps of Bangladesh, to “convince” the refugees to return. His delegation argued NVC cards would help verify the identity of refugees returning to Myanmar. He pledged that cardholders would be granted freedom of movement, access to healthcare and education, and permission to cross the border.

With the introduction of the Smart Cards, activists feared the shared data of their Smart Cards would again allow Myanmar to propose the much-hated NVC card to them, only this time with UN entities conferring legitimacy upon it.

One group within the camp, called the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, vocally opposed the Smart Card, and organized some mobilisation against it. The organisation came under pressure from the authorities, thus the protests were not that widespread, and were later called off in December of 2018. The group leader, Mohibullah, saved face by claiming that the name Rohingya will be included in the process, but this was not an actual win for the protesters — the name had been in the database field since 2017, when the cards were first introduced. To date, the name Rohingya still does not appear on the actual Smart Card.

Refugees beaten for refusing Smart Card registration

The Smart Card registration process has also been harrowing for many refugees. In 2018, I began hearing reports of various types of “irregularities,” coercion and beatings. In interviews I conducted, witnesses reported incidents at the point of information collection, and beatings meted out by officials.

On 10 October 2018, several women in Musini camp recorded video interviews in a distressed state describing their rough treatment, including beatings, by the camp authorities the day earlier. Nay San Lwin, of the Free Rohingya Coalition, decided to take the videos and show them personally to the then Bangladesh Foreign Secretary, Shahidul Haque. He complained that refugees were being beaten for refusing the Smart Card.

Soon thereafter, Nay San Lwin was barred from the camps, and Bangladesh intelligence agencies began to monitor his movements. The head of the country's office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, Abul Kalam, issued a swift denial of the violence.

Taslima's family received their Smart Cards in July of 2019, long after the agitation against the cards had ceased. Taslima says she still felt some trepidation when they had their biometric data collected.

“I had to stand in line the whole day,” she said. “They told us they would withhold rations and that we couldn't stay in the camps. So we had no choice.”

When I told that her Smart Card will hold information about her for years, maybe decades, Taslima looked puzzled.

“They are going to know everything about us,” she said. “But they never told us anything. They also took our photographs – just like in Burma.”

For Rohingya refugees, ID systems have brought coercion, violence and denial of ethnic identity

"They told us they would withhold rations and that we couldn’t stay in the camps. So we had no choice."

Der Elefant im Raum

Man kann das Urteil N.D. und N.T. gg. Spanien der großen Kammer des EGMR so sehen, dass hier zwei auf illegalen Wegen angekommene, nicht schutzbedürftige Migranten auf legale Zugangswege verwiesen wurden. Wer es dafür feiert, übersieht die Implikationen des Urteils für die effektive Gewährleistung des Grundsatzes der Nichtzurückweisung.

Nach bisheriger Rechtsprechung nicht nur des EGMR (z.B. M.S.S., Hirsi, Sharifi, EuGH: Gnandi) gilt, dass Staaten ihrer Verantwortung, Menschen nicht in eine unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Situation zu bringen, nachkommen, indem Abschiebungskandidaten Gelegenheit gegeben wird, ein Schutzbegehren anzubringen und die Gefährdungslage ggf. substantiell geprüft wird. Das Recht, nicht in eine Art. 3 EMRK widersprechende Situation gebracht zu werden, ist eine absolute Garantie und muss, wie der EGMR auch in diesem Urteil (Rn. 171) wieder betont, praktisch wirksam gewährleistet werden. Aus Art. 13 EMRK müssen Betroffene die Möglichkeit haben, die Zulässigkeit der Abschiebung in einem mindestens vorläufigen Rechtsschutzverfahren überprüfen zu lassen, und zwar vor der Abschiebung. Wird ungeprüft abgeschoben und Rechtsschutz im Nachhinein gewährt, kann die absolut zu vermeidende, unmenschliche Folge des Abschiebehandelns bereits eingetreten sein. Und zumal in Fällen, in denen tatsächlich ein Schutzbedürfnis besteht, fände meist überhaupt keine Prüfung statt, denn wem gelingt es schon, aus einer Art. 3 EMRK widersprechenden Situation heraus Verfahren vor ausländischen Gerichten in die Wege zu leiten. Kurz: Schieben Staaten Menschen ohne die genannten Maßgaben („heiß“) ab, wird Art. 3 EMRK nicht effektiv gewährleistet.

Wie kann der EGMR angesichts dessen vertreten, es sei Staaten unter der EMRK erlaubt, unter Umständen wie denen des Falles N.D. und N.T. heiß abzuschieben? Bezüglich beider Beschwerdeführer war mittlerweile abschließend geklärt, dass sie nicht schutzbedürftig waren und insofern in ihren Rechten aus Art. 3, 13 EMRK nicht verletzt wurden. Zu beurteilen war das Vorgehen Spaniens – ein Vorgehen zu einem Zeitpunkt, als die Gefährdungslage der Beschwerdeführer noch ungeklärt war – jetzt unter Art. 4 4. ZP, dem Kollektivausweisungsverbot. 

Die Vorschrift dient, wie der EGMR ausführt (Rn. 198), der Einhaltung des refoulement-Verbots. Anders als Art. 3, 13 EMRK, der nur bei denjenigen heiß abgeschobenen Personen verletzt wird, die sich als schutzbedürftig herausstellen, kann Art. 4 4. ZP ohnedies verletzt werden. Art. 13 EMRK ist akzessorisch, eine Kollektivausweisung kann man auch unabhängig von einer bestehenden Schutzbedürftigkeit beanstanden. Der EGMR meint nun, ein Verstoß gegen das Kollektivausweisungsverbot liege nicht vor, wenn die Betroffenen die heiße Abschiebung sozusagen selbst verschulden, weil sie kollektiv illegal Grenzschutzanlagen überwinden, statt sich auf den von Spanien zur Verfügung gestellten Wegen – insbes. bei der Grenzübergangsstelle Beni Anzar – um legalen Zugang zu bemühen (Rn. 201, 206 ff).

Einmal abgesehen von der Frage, wie sich dieses Verständnis von Art. 4 4. ZP mit seinem Wortlaut vereinbaren lässt – der EGMR handelt seine Argumentation unter dem Merkmal „kollektiv“ ab (Rn. 192 ff) –, irritiert unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Schutzfunktion für die Einhaltung des refoulement-Verbots, dass die Art und Weise des Zugangs und eventuelles Fehlverhalten der Betroffenen bei der Wahl des Zugangsweges überhaupt eine Rolle dafür spielen sollen, ob heiß abgeschoben werden darf. Solche Umstände ändern ja nichts daran, dass heiße Abschiebungen mit refoulement-Verstößen verbunden sind, wenn sich unter den abgeschobenen Personen auch schutzbedürftige befinden, und das wird bei heißen Abschiebungen nun mal nicht ausgeschlossen. Es kann wohl nicht angenommen werden, der EGMR wolle, indem er hier zwecks effektiveren Grenzschutzes eine Art Schutzwürdigkeitsprüfung einführt, in einem Urteil zu Art. 4 4. ZP davon abrücken, dass Art. 3 EMRK eine absolute Garantie ist. Nicht mal Völkermörder dürfen in eine unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Situation abgeschoben werden, also wohl auch nicht auf illegalen Wegen angekommene Schutzsuchende, die es versäumt haben, sich vorab um legalen Zugang zu bemühen.

Es kommt hinzu, dass es laut EGMR auf die tatsächliche Erreichbarkeit der Grenzübergangsstelle für die jeweils Betroffenen letztlich nicht einmal ankommen soll (andernfalls müsste eigentlich allein schon deshalb individuell geprüft werden, denn mindestens die „schuldlosen“ Fälle wären von der heißen Abschiebung auszunehmen). Es begründe keine Verantwortlichkeit Spaniens unter der EMRK, so der EGMR (Rn. 218 ff), wenn marokkanische Kräfte den Zugang verhindern, Spanien unterliege aus der EMRK keiner Pflicht, dafür zu sorgen, dass Schutzsuchende es bis an die Grenzübergangsstelle schaffen. In der Tat, aus der EMRK kann man, ungeachtet eventueller Kooperationsabsprachen, eine spanische Verantwortung für drittstaatliches Ausreiseverhinderungsverhalten wohl nicht herleiten, und es ist auch richtig, dass Spanien sich nicht aktiv um Zugang bis zur Grenze bemühen muss. Aber war denn das die Frage? Zu Prüfung stand, ob Spanien unter der EMRK nebst Zusatzprotokollen für sein eigenes, Zwang anwendendes, heißes Abschiebungsverhalten zur Verantwortung gezogen werden kann. Wenn das nicht mehr der Fall sein soll, weil Spanien irgendwo eine (nicht mal notwendig zugängliche) Tür im Grenzzaun vorhält, was bleibt dann von der Schutzfunktion des Art. 4 4. ZP für die Einhaltung des refoulement-Verbots? 

Und was bleibt vom refoulement-Verbot selbst (und vom Flüchtlingsschutz), wenn Menschen, die mangels für sie realistisch erreichbarer, legaler Möglichkeiten, ein Schutzbegehren anzubringen, irregulär Zugang suchen und finden, künftig ungeprüft abgeschoben werden dürfen? Der EGMR betont mehrfach, dass Staaten Grenzschutz betreiben, sich dabei aber ihrer Verantwortung für die effektive Einhaltung des refoulement-Verbots nicht entziehen dürfen (Rn. 167 ff, 181 ff, 232). Personen, die anders als die Beschwerdeführer des vorliegenden Falles schutzbedürftig sind, dürfen also weiterhin nicht abgeschoben werden, das wäre ein refoulement-Verstoß. Nur: Wie sollen die Staaten das jetzt sicherstellen? Wie kann man heiße Abschiebungen vornehmen und Art. 3 EMRK effektiv garantieren? Das ist der Elefant im Raum, zu dem das Urteil, ungeachtet der Relevanz der Frage für die Auslegung des Art. 4 4. ZP, schweigt – und das macht es zu einem Fehlurteil.

Die Rolle, für menschenrechtsgerechte Verhältnisse in der europäischen Asyl- und Grenzschutzpolitik zu – eine Rolle, die der EGMR bisher zuverlässiger wahrgenommen hatte als der EuGH –, fällt an dieser Stelle den nationalen Gerichten und dem EuGH zu. Selbst wenn der EuGH sich bei Gelegenheit zu Art. 19 I GRC dem EGMR anschließen sollte: Heiße Abschiebungen kann er nicht unbeanstandet lassen, auch nicht in Fällen, in denen die fehlende Schutzbedürftigkeit der Betroffenen im Nachhinein feststeht. Für Art. 47 GRC genügt anders als für Art. 13 EMRK, dass einfaches Recht es verbietet, Menschen ohne die eingangs dieses Beitrags genannten Maßgaben abzuschieben. Die der effektiven Einhaltung des refoulement-Verbots dienenden und durch sie auch gebotenen prozeduralen Maßgaben – unional z.B. Art. 6 ff, 43, 46 AsylVfRL, Art. 9, 12 f RückfRL, Art. 5, 26 f Dublin-III-VO – gelten selbstverständlich auch für Menschen, die sich später als nicht schutzbedürftig herausstellen. Denn genau das muss erst geprüft werden, und zwar auch dann, wenn es um eine Abschiebung in Drittstaaten geht. Nur wenn trotz Gelegenheit kein Asylantrag gestellt (oder einer geprüft und abgelehnt) wurde, greift die Rückführungslinie. An deren Stelle kann an den Außengrenzen unter Umständen auch nach nationalem Recht vorgegangen werden. Dabei ist aber das refoulement-Verbot einzuhalten, was das nationale Recht durch geeignete prozedurale Maßgaben effektiv gewährleisten muss. Die Rechtsschutzgarantien der nationalen Verfassungen (jedenfalls Art. 24 (1) der span. Verfassung) funktionieren wie Art. 47 GRC, nicht wie Art. 13 EMRK, setzen also einen refoulement-Verstoß nicht voraus, es reicht eine Verstoß gegen die prozeduralen Maßgaben. 

Nach allem bestehen Chancen, dass der bisherige Grundkonsens – dass das non-refoulement eine absolut und effektiv zu gewährleistende Garantie ist, in deren Konsequenz Menschen nicht ohne substantielle Prüfung einer evtl. Gefährdungslage abgeschoben werden dürfen – wieder in den vorigen, klaren Stand eingesetzt werden wird.

Der magnetische Nordpol "rast" weiter Richtung Sibirien

Besorgniserregend: Die Starlink-Satelliten von Elon Musk [Astrodicticum Simplex]

Besorgniserregend. So hat die Internationale Astronomische Union (IAU) die Dinge genannt die gerade an unserem Nachthimmel ablaufen. Es geht allerdings nicht um Asteroideneinschläge, Sternexplosionen oder andere Gefahren aus dem Kosmos. Sondern um die Starlink-Satelliten von Elon Musks Firma SpaceX. Ein Netzwerk von Satelliten soll den Planeten umspannen um weltweit Internetzugang zu bieten. Dafür sollen in den nächsten Jahren mehr als 10.000 Satelliten ins All geschossen werden; vielleicht sogar mehr als 40.000. Seit 2018 hat SpaceX schon 302 Stück der knapp 250 Kilogramm schweren künstlichen Monde in einem Umlaufbahn um die Erde gebracht und die nächsten Starts sind schon geplant. Internet überall auf dem Planeten ist mit Sicherheit eine gute Idee. Aber es hat Folgen wenn die Zahl der Satelliten so schnell so stark erhöht wird. Genau damit hat sich die IAU nun offiziell beschäftigt und sie hat diese Folgen als “besorgniserregend” bezeichnet.

Das Problem ist leicht zu verstehen: Wenn Astronominnen und Astronomen ihre Teleskope zum Himmel richten, dann wollen sie dort Sterne, Planeten, Asteroiden, Galaxien und den ganzen Rest beobachten der uns sagen kann wie das Universum funktioniert. Es reicht aber nicht zu schauen; man muss die Daten auch entsprechend auswerten. Wir wollen die Bilder ja nicht einfach nur anschauen; wir sind am Licht der Objekte interessiert. Je mehr davon, desto besser. Das heißt aber auch, dass man das Teleskop unter Umständen sehr lange auf einen bestimmten Bereich des Himmels richten muss um ausreichend viel Licht sammeln zu können. Wenn aber zwischen Teleskop und den fernen kosmischen Himmelskörper ein paar zehntausend Satelliten ihre Runde um die Erde ziehen, dann stehen die Chancen mehr als gut, dass ein paar davon durchs Bild fliegen.

60 Starlink-Satelliten kurz bevor sie im All ausgesetzt werden (Bild: SpaceX, gemeinfrei

Genaugenommen kann man quasi mit Sicherheit davon ausgehen, dass man nicht nur das auf den Aufnahmen sieht was man sehen will, sondern eben auch einen ganzen Schwung der Starlink-Satelliten. Die orbitalen Fotobomber stören die Aufnahme. Die IAU hat das am Beispiel des Vera-Rubin-Großteleskops abgeschätzt:

“For instance, in the case of modern fast wide-field surveys, like the ones to be carried out by the Rubin Observatory (formerly known as LSST), it is estimated that up to 30% of the 30-second images during twilight hours will be affected.”

Man kann die Spuren der Satelliten zwar in der Nachbearbeitung quasi rausrechnen. Das erhöht aber die Zeit und Kosten deutlich, die man in die Arbeit investieren muss. Im Online-Standard wurde zu dem Thema auch Stefan Kimeswenger, Professor für Astrophysik an der Universität Innsbruck, interviewt, der darauf hinweist, dass man in Zukunft nur noch mitten in der Nacht einigermaßen ungestört beobachten kann wenn die meisten Satelliten quasi im Schatten der Erde stehen und kein Sonnenlicht reflektieren. Dadurch reduziert sich die effektive Zeit in der astronomische Arbeit an Großteleskopen durchgeführt werden kann um mindestens eine Stunde am Anfang und Ende der Nacht. Kimeswenger hat auf ein weiteres Problem hingewiesen: Den Weltraummüll. Je mehr Objekte um die Erde herumfliegen, desto mehr Schrott gibt es auch. Bei den enormen Geschwindigkeiten mit denen sich die Objekte bewegen, reichen schon winzige Schrottstückchen um Schäden anzurichten. Und auch die Gefahr von Kollisionen steigt. Immer öfter müssen Satelliten Ausweichmanöver fliegen – was Treibstoff und Arbeitszeit kostet. Im September 2019 musste ein Satellit der ESA einem der Starlink-Satelliten ausweichen. Obwohl, wie Kimesweger sagt, eigentlich Starlink an der Reihe gewesen wäre, aus dem Weg zu fliegen. Was SpaceX aber, trotz entsprechender Aufforderungen, nicht getan hat.

19 Starlink-Satelliten stören eine Aufnahme des Himmels die 5,5 Minuten lang belichtet wurde (NSF’s National Optical-Infrared Astronomy Research Laboratory/CTIO/AURA/DELVE)

Es ist derzeit noch unklar, wie sich die Sache weiter entwickeln wird. Wir wissen nicht, wie viele Satelliten am Ende wirklich um die Erde fliegen werden. Und auch nicht, ob und welche Maßnahmen von SpaceX (und den anderen Firmen die ebenfalls riesige Satellitennetzwerke planen) getroffen werden um die Helligkeit ihrer Objekte zu reduzieren. Es ist ebenfalls unklar, wie sich die Satelliten auf die Radioastronomie auswirken werden. Was aber auf jeden Fall sicher ist: Man muss sich mit der Situation beschäftigen. Es braucht eine vernünftige Diskussion aller Beteiligten und vernünftige Regeln. Der erdnahe Weltraum ist eine wichtige wissenschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Ressource. Der Himmel ist aber auch ein Kulturgut der uns allen gehört und nicht von irgendwelchen Firmen einfach so beansprucht und besetzt werden darf! Hier auf der Erde haben wir (nicht überall aber zumindest doch sehr oft) entsprechende Regeln getroffen und bestimmte Regionen als Naturschutzbereiche deklariert obwohl es bestimmt jede Menge Leute gibt, die dort gerne nach Bodenschätzen graben, Fabriken bauen oder sie sonst irgendwie wirtschaftlich nutzen wollen. Wir brauchen entsprechende Regeln für den Weltraum. Wenn irgendwer in Alaska nach Öl bohrt oder Wälder in Indonesien abholzt, dann können wir uns vielleicht noch einreden, dass das ja alles weit weg ist und uns nicht betrifft. Der Himmel ist aber immer über uns. Wir sollten uns sehr genau überlegen was wir tun, bevor wir uns den Blick auf das Universum mit tausenden Satelliten blockieren.

Private (Transnational) Power without Authority

On 9 September 2019 Facebook banned from its platforms all pages and profiles related to the Italian far-right organization “CasaPound”, for the violation of its Community Standard no. 12 (hate speech and incitement to violence). CasaPound – whose political program is a classic combination of totalitarianism, militarism and nationalism – is a relatively small but extremely active group, targeting with violent actions minorities in suburban slums, political opponents and sometimes left-wing journalists. On 11 December 2019, the Tribunal of Rome (ToR) adopted the precautionary measure ordering Facebook Ireland Ltd. to restore the pages and their content and to pay the losses. The decision raises significant issues in several respects and might serve as a model to courts beyond Italy.

Although many members have been convicted in past years, CasaPound as such is yet to be dissolved via existing anti-fascist legislation. It is therefore a “legitimate” actor in the Italian political landscape, regularly taking part in local and national elections.

Despite its poor election results, the political danger posed by CasaPound and similar organizations should not be underestimated. It results from their contribution to the normalization of fascist-like language and ideas, an ongoing transnational process in which social media play a crucial role. Given the features of contemporary political discourse, CasaPound’s very “existence” as a political actor of any significance depends on its +40,000 Twitter followers and – before the ban – 280.000 Facebook “likes”, without which it would probably be a little less than a politically-flavored criminal organization. However, and quite importantly, CasaPound hardly posted online explicitly fascist content, rather saving this kind of speech for other channels of communication.

The Tribunal’s line of reasoning

The first issue relates to the quite unconventional line of reasoning, which did not focus on the parties’ contractual obligations, but rather on those arising directly from art. 49 Constitution (“Any citizen has the right to freely establish parties to contribute to determining national policies through democratic processes”). Importantly, the ToR’s decision can only be understood in the context of the right to (collective) political participation, rather than the – admittedly overlapping but distinct – right to freedom of expression. Keeping in mind these starting points, the reasoning can be summarized in three steps.

  1. Facebook has de facto reached a systemic role to the purposes of political participation under art. 49 Const.
  2. Given such systemic role – and departing from a relatively well-established case law of the Supreme Court (e.g. judg. no. 31022/2015) qualifying Facebook as a mere “private messaging service establishing a network of relationship among people in the same system” – the ToR held that Facebook has a “special position” towards private individuals.
  3. As a further consequence, besides the obligations arising from its contractual will, Facebook is bound by those arising from constitutional principles (principi costituzionali e ordinamentali). Therefore, although it did not explicitly refer to such doctrine, the measure constitutes an example of direct horizontal effect (unmittelbare Drittwirkung), whereby private actors are directly bound by constitutional duties, i.e. without resorting to constitution-oriented interpretation of private law or contractual clauses; or to the declaration of unconstitutionality of applicable legislation.

Having re-shaped the range of Facebook’s obligations, the ToR found that the complaint concerning CasaPound’s right to political participation had some prima facie ground (fumus boni iuris) and was potentially subject to irreparable damage pending ordinary proceedings (periculum in mora), thus granting the precautionary measure. Although adopted in a proceeding with limited evidence-collection and prima facie merits assessments – and the ToR itself stressed that the ordinary proceedings could well turn out differently – the decision still provided several interesting elements of reflection, especially as concerns the power relationship between Facebook and CasaPound.

Facebook in the eyes of the ToR: bound by the Constitution but no “keeper of the Constitution”

Already at the linguistic level, the opinion significantly switches from “Facebook Ireland Ltd.” (the procedural defendant) to “Facebook” tout court, somehow downsizing the relevance of corporate personality to the purposes of the decision. Put differently: The ToR’s language gives the impression that it is not Facebook as an individuated corporate person to infringe upon the constitutional obligation, but rather Facebook as a (business) enterprise, a transnational actor in control of a good amount of the communication flow relevant to political discourse and participation. Further, the ToR explicitly qualified the ban as a “sanction”, rather than a countermeasure to a breach of contract.

At a more substantial level, the decision can be framed as a review of the proportionality of Facebook’s conduct. According to the ToR, the contents shared by CasaPound did not reach a degree of gravity such as to justify the outright ban, i.e. a de facto exclusion from political debate: a more proportionate (and possibly legitimate) reaction would have been removing the single contents, with a more circumscribed limitation of CasaPound’s single exercises of freedom of speech.

Facebook’s argument, that the ban “sanctioned” the fact that CasaPound is a political organization intrinsically against the Constitution and human rights law, was also rejected. Neglecting such role of “keeper of the Constitution”, the ToR held that it is not up to Facebook to determine if CasaPound is a legitimate actor in the Italian political landscape, taking also into consideration that it has been active for more than ten years without being outlawed by competent Italian authorities. Admittedly, such statement goes in a direction opposite to that taken in Germany with the contested 2017 Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG) and in France with the bill no. 1785, designing systems whereby major social media platforms are tasked with – and potentially held responsible for – gate-keeper functions against hate speech and fake news on the Internet.

In a nutshell, the ToR “saw” in legal terms the private power and accordingly attached obligations to it, but did not recognize Facebook as a legitimate actor to autonomously take decisions with potentially far-reaching political consequences. The ToR thus denied Facebook’s authority – at least as long as it uses its power in a way deemed disproportionate. In this last regard, looking at Facebook as a global institution and its Standards as a transnational private regulation or even a semi-autonomous legal system, it could be argued that the decision features some elements of the Italian ‘counter-limits’ doctrine, the (in-)famous tool of management of inter-systemic relationship aimed at preventing external legal sources to be applied into the domestic system, when they risk to jeopardize the “fundamental principles of the constitutional order”.

The quest for a (transnational) horizontal effect and the need for supranational regulation

The ToR’s measure stands out for its bold application of (direct) horizontal effect. Indeed, while the horizontal effect is not a novelty in the practice of Italian courts, the Italian Constitution – contrary to arts. 1(3) and 9(3) of the German Basic Law or § 8(2) of the South African Constitution – has no express provision concerning the scope of application of constitutional rights. As a result, the horizontal effect has been applied in quite an unpredictable way, mainly on a case-by-case basis. The differences with the US functional equivalents – the “State action” and “public forum” doctrines – are especially striking, as even the most advanced application of these latter require some “color of State law” (see Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, 9 July 2019; Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 US __ (2019)). Certainly, the US solutions give better guidance to judges and more certainty to private individuals, but remain largely blind to social de facto powers that might be able to infringe upon constitutional rights just like State actors. Therefore, while the dangers to legal certainty should not be underestimated, such admittedly ambitious attempts must probably be welcomed, in an age where transnational private (especially economic) powers are more and more able to escape constitutional constraints.

However, the decision also raises the conflict-of-laws issues typical of any horizontal effect towards transnational actors. Firstly, the measure is to be enforced by Irish courts, and it cannot be excluded that an order to restore the access to a social media platform of a far-right organization may run contrary to the Irish ordre public under art. 45 Reg. 1215/2012/EU. Secondly, the order may give rise to overlapping and conflicting obligations under the laws of other States, e.g. the above-mentioned German NetzDG. Faced with conflicting impulses coming from different States, a transnational actor such as Facebook has to select and re-elaborate them in its internal law- and decision-making. This process inevitably results in a form of legal Darwinism, penalizing weaker States.

The ToR’s decision therefore highlights the need for a comprehensive hard law regulation (at least) at the European level, which would go beyond the piecemeal approach adopted by the EU so far with Dir. 2000/31/EC on E-Commerce; Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA requiring Member States to sanction by means of criminal law public incitement to violence or hatred; Dir. 2010/13/EU on Audiovisual Media Services; and lastly with the 2016 Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, a soft law instrument of co-regulation, elaborated by the Commission together with four leading companies of the industry.

However, any form of supranational regulation, especially if restrictive of the rights of freedom of speech and to political participation, 1) would require a difficult political consensus, among States interpreting in extremely different ways their identities of “militant democracies”; and 2) must take into account existing human rights law. Therefore, it is also worth briefly assessing the ToR’s decision against this background.

Varieties of “militant democracies” and compatibility with international law

The obstacles concerning the reach of a consensus among different States on banning parties from political arenas emerge entirely, if one sees the ToR’s decision as a manifestation of the Italian (version of) “militant democracy”. The latter has been famously categorized by Niesen as a “negative Republicanism”, i.e. the self-definition of a democracy in contrast to a particular authoritarian past. Such “negative Republicanism” differs markedly from the abstract and quasi-universal German approach, labelled as “anti-extremism”, not just because it is past-oriented, but also because it assumes a relatively more fragmented political-ideological landscape, and thus a reactive rather than proactive attitude towards anti-democratic tendencies.

Such “negative Republicanism” is based on the idea that – instead of being expelled outside the political arena – extremist movements can be re-absorbed into a constitutional (“Republican”) consensus through the hidden but constant “normalizing effect” of democratic procedures. Right or wrong, such attitude gives further explanations as for why the Italian anti-fascist legislation led to the dissolution of a far-right organization only once (Ordine Nuovo in 1973); and for the stark rejection by the ToR of Facebook’s (self-attributed) “gatekeeper functions”. To sum up, the ToR’s decision does not run against the tenets of “militant democracy” but rather represents a specific implementation of them.

At the same time, the ToR’s measure cannot be said to infringe upon international law. After all, there is no positive obligation for States to generally prevent fascist or any other extremist organizations to access social media platforms. On the contrary, under human rights law the right to free speech can only be restricted according to narrowly defined parameters. Hate speech regulation must carefully weigh freedom of expression (art. 19 ICCPR) against prohibition of incitement to hatred (art. 20 ICCPR). Indeed, there is only a fine line between the two, visible from the “safety net” of freedom of expression that human rights instruments often include. The above-mentioned Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA or the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, for instance, underline that they shall not interfere with freedom of speech standards. Where such a provision is not explicitly comprised, States have often brought forward reservations on its basis.

Of course, freedom of expression cannot be understood as to per se cover hate speech. Art. 10 ECHR, for instance, has traditionally been interpreted by the ECtHR as to comprise an internal barrier to incitement of hatred (see e.g. Perinçek v. Switzerland, 15 October 2015). Only very recently has art. 17 on the prohibition of abuse of a right been applied in the context of anti-Semitic speech (M’Bala M’Bala v. France, 20 October 2015). Overall, limiting the freedom of expression nonetheless “must remain an exception”, as even the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of hatred puts it. For the specific case of online publications, the Human Rights Committee has also clarified in its General Comment No. 34 that this entails only “content-specific” removals being permissible. Further, from the case law of the ECtHR it emerges that, far from being obliged to restrict the overall-access of an extremist political organization to social media, States are only allowed to ensure that the respective postings are deleted (Delfi v. Estonia, 16 June 2015) in cases where single content constitutes unlawful hate speech or incitement to violence. Without the pivotal element of hate speech or “clearly unlawful” content the right to free speech is to be ensured (Phil v. Sweden, 7 February 2017; Magyar Tartalomszolgátatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2 February 2016). A positive obligation has recently been found to exist (Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 14 January 2020) but, once again, it concerned only the issue of investigating whether a posting might constitute hate speech, and not the overall access to social media.

After this brief excursus, it is fair to conclude that there is no incompatibility between existing international law and the ToR’s decision. This is especially true, if one considers its stark distinction between the right to freedom of expression concerning the single content/posting and the right to political participation concerning the overall access to social media platforms, as well as the related proportionality assessment of Facebook’s “sanction”. As formal, problematic and far-fetched as this distinction may be, it adds further elements of complexity to a decision that probably will not remain isolated, and whose line of reasoning might serve as a model to other courts worldwide.

DEM-DEC Research Update Editorial: Global Democracy and the Fierce Urgency of 2020

Latest Global Research Update Just Issued

The first Global Research Update on the global platform Democratic Decay & Renewal (DEM-DEC) for 2020 is now available here, covering late December 2019 to early February 2020.  In each Update I write an editorial on key themes to help users to navigate the Update, and to provide some limited commentary, especially on very recent research. 

1    The Fierce Urgency of 2020

In January 2017, in my inaugural column for the ICONnect Blog, I urged an end to the complacency bedeviling any real effort to address threats to democracy worldwide. Borrowing a phrase from Martin Luther King, I spoke of “the fierce urgency of now”, insisting that “failing to act and adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude is to court disaster.” Three years later, I – and many colleagues worldwide – feel that urgency with even greater intensity and frustration. Global reports continue to warn of the ongoing global democratic crisis – in January alone the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index for 2019, a report from the newly-launched Cambridge Centre on the Future of Democracy, and the Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2020 warn of everything from plummeting public satisfaction with democracy to the “existential threat” posed by the Chinese government to human rights frameworks worldwide. Articles for the Journal of Democracy’s thirtieth anniversary edition, by heavy-hitters such as Francis Fukuyama and Yascha Mounk, address the multiple threats facing liberal democracy and whether it can rebuild itself. Technology looms large in our fears, with talk of its use as a tool of ‘sharp power’ by authoritarian governments, and, elsewhere, the impending threat of ‘deep fakes’   threatening an exponential acceleration of truth decay and distortion of democratic discourse.

Political developments so far in 2020 have fed the sense of ever-higher stakes in the global democratic crisis. President Trump’s impeachment trial featured starkly undemocratic argument (albeit later narrowed somewhat) that anything the President does to further his reelection in the public interest cannot be an impeachable offence – a timely article by Andrew Pardue is a useful analysis here. Across the Atlantic, the Polish government’s assault on judicial independence has induced constitutional chaos, with battle lines drawn between captured and independent courts on the legality of so-called reforms (read more here). From Malta’s downgrade in the EIU Index to a “flawed democracy”, to the breaking of political taboos in Germany with the attempt to install a new Thuringian premier with the aid of far-right AfD votes, there is a sense of intensifying threat. Sumit Ganguly in the Journal of Democracy argues that India’s claim to be a liberal democracy is “increasingly dubious”. In Australia, John Keane offers that the “grand political lesson” from the devastation of the recent bushfires is that the current democratic model has failed and we need a new, ecologically viable, model.

Yet, complacency still abounds. Alongside ongoing inaction by national and international political actors, the leading US philosopher Martha Nussbaum recently offered that talk of democratic crisis is little more than “an academic fad”. This is an all-too-common refrain, one I have heard for years. “But!”, the critic will say: democracy has always been contested; all democracies suffer some level of dysfunction; liberals are obsessed with procedure and civility, and fail to understand the injustice of the status quo ante. There is of course some truth in this: there is no real ‘golden age’ of ideal democracy; the trend of decay is not entirely universal (e.g. some countries’ scores actually improved in the EIU Index); today’s challenges are deeply rooted; and we inevitably see analysts ‘bandwagon jumping’ on the current hot topic. Yet, to dismiss the mounting evidence of serious threats to liberal democracy in states worldwide – not least that collated since mid-2018 by DEM-DEC – as a form of ‘moral panic’ or collective delusion is truly dangerous. Even if well-intentioned, it becomes a form of continual gaslighting that feeds complacency and saps resolve, and lends succour to those who really wish to end accountable government and pull power away from the people they are meant to serve. In the impeachment trial, Senator Adam Schiff decried the “normalization of lawlessness”, and this is precisely what is at play: as Robert Sata and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski observe in the case of Hungary and Poland, a central ploy of wannabe authoritarians is to frame  radical changes as “politics as usual”, when in fact they challenge the very essence of liberal democracy. If we cannot assess – based on significant evidence and an appreciation of degree – certain measures as ‘abnormal’, we are lost. 

2    Civil Society Pushback Clicks into High Gear

Whereas governments and international organisations seem to remain somewhat unequal to the task of pushing back against the myriad threats to democracy worldwide, civil society worldwide appears to be stepping up the pushback for 2020. The billionaire philanthropist George Soros – much reviled by authoritarian leaders worldwide – has pledged $1 billion to fund a new Open Society University Network (OSUN) to combat the “twin challenges” of authoritarian governments and climate change. Two new centres have been launched: as well as Cambridge University’s new Centre for the Future of Democracy, mentioned above, a new Chicago Center on Democracy at the University of Chicago aims to provides a space for both researchers to further their work on democracy, and to host Bright Line Watch, an initiative to monitor democratic practices, their resilience, and potential threats. In Asia, the Asia Democracy Network (ADN) just announced its #2020Pushback Campaign “calling all democracy advocates to unite and begin fighting back against threats and attacks to democracy.” 

3    The International Face of Pushback

It is striking, too, how much action and thought regarding democratic defence is taking place at the international level. Indeed, the Council of Europe has just introduced a new sanctioning mechanism for “the most serious” violations of the Council’s Statute (which includes democracy and the rule of law), separate to its existing review mechanisms under the European Court of Human Rights and other bodies. In this Update, Tom Carothers in the Journal of Democracy discusses the need to rejuvenate democracy promotion, by tackling both new and established democracies; strengthening the economic dimension; and bringing technological issues centre-stage. Pacifique Manirakiza, writing in a special collection to mark the 10th anniversary of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, argues for the existence of a subsidiary right to resist “gross undemocratic practices” by governments who deny meaningful political participation. For a comparative perspective, a scholar to watch is Cassandra Emmons, who has just completed a PhD at Princeton on ‘Regional Organizations as Democracy Defenders: Designing Effective Toolkits’. Elsewhere, Anna Meyerrose in Comparative Political Studies (January 2020) contends that membership of democracy-promoting international organisations can be detrimental to democracy – a stance which will prompt much discussion.

4    Democratic Innovation Goes Mainstream 

While pushback is crucial, it alone is not enough: for many analysts, if we are to protect democracy we must re-make democracy. Last Friday I was among 20 experts invited to attend a special roundtable as part of the Australian Senate’s inquiry into nationhood, national identity and democracy, and it was striking how many experts around the table were in favour of experimenting with deliberative mechanisms, such as a citizens’ assembly or even a Citizens’ Senate. 2020 seems poised to be the year when such experimentation goes fully mainstream worldwide, with bodies proliferating – and academic and policy attention increasing. Key items in this Update include: the landmark Handbook of Democratic Innovation edited by Stephen Elstub and Oliver Escobar; Cristina Lafont’s monograph Democracy Without Shortcuts arguing that we can only achieve better outcomes through the long road of deliberation and “changing hearts and minds”; and articles in Policy Sciences on experts and evidence in mini-publics, as well as how politicians and others view the place of such bodies in decision-making. The first weeks of 2020 have already seen a range of events on democratic innovation (including a major conference in Manchester), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has just launched Participo, a digest on their work on innovative Citizen Participation. Details of future events for 2020 can be found in the DEM-DEC Events Database

5     Democracy 2020: Announcing a Stock-Taking Roundtable

Current crises have diverted much intellectual energy toward potential solutions. Beyond deliberative innovations, we see for instance a new collection in the Drake Law Review contemplating radical ways of amending and fine-tuning the US Constitution. As a way of bringing together the discourses on democratic decay and democratic renewal in a meaningful way, DEM-DEC has teamed up with the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) to organize a 2-day roundtable on 10-11 December, on the theme ‘Assessing Constitutional Decay, Breakdown  and Renewal Worldwide’. Co-organised by myself and Prof. Wojciech Sadurski, the roundtable aims to convene a group of leading and emerging scholars to engage in a global ‘stock-taking’ exercise, aiming to map the health and trajectory of key democracies worldwide, pin-point gaps in analysis, and push the research agenda forward. You can find the Call for Papers here (deadline: 1 May 2020). 

6     Taking the Long View

While today’s democracy defenders and innovators feel the fierce urgency of the present moment, we also risk being swamped by the sheer speed of the news cycle, especially in our hyper-connected global ‘firehose’ information economy that can leave little mental space for reflection. Many items in this Update help to put today’s trends in a broader context. A new book from our DEM-DEC partner V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy), Measuring Two Centuries of Political Change, offers a user’s guide to their vast data collection project. Also looking backwards, see Susan and Hennessy and Benjamin Wittes’ new book placing the US presidency in historical context; and an excellent piece by Jill Lepore in the New Yorker on ‘The Last Time Liberal Democracy Almost Died’. Looking forward, the Centre for the Future of Democracy’s research mission aims to explore three areas: ‘Democracy and Climate Change’; ‘The Generational Divide’; and ‘Technology and Democracy’. Also on climate change (and issues such as biodiversity), John Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering’s 2018 book Politics of the Anthropocene (suggested for addition by a DEM-DEC user) dovetails with John Keane’s analysis, arguing that our Holocene-era democratic political structures need adaptation to a new reality. Get Involved

You can help us grow the Research Database, and showcase your own research, on DEM-DEC by:

*Performing the law / LE BUREAU_DES_DEPOSITIONS*

Performing the law / LE #BUREAU_DES_DEPOSITIONS

Comment qualifier le bureau des dépositions sans passer à côté des causes (déterminées) et des fins (encore inconnues) de ce collectif dont les performances ne sont ni des représentations ni des manifestations mais du “droit en train de se faire”… Nous retrouvons les lignes directrices du Labex performing the law mais dans une dimension encore plus aboutie. Il ne s’agit pas de dire que la #performance en elle-même est plus travaillée mais de souligner ici que la #fabrique_du_droit est encore plus essentielle, intrinsèque au projet.

Un projet qui correspond parfaitement à une publication sur un carnet de recherches car on avance ici de brouillon en brouillon, l’œuvre collective évoluant au fur et à mesure des rencontres visibles et publiques mais aussi des événements quotidiens qui affectent les différents intervenants. Car la frontière entre vie privée et scène publique se veut ici poreuse puisque nous sommes aux marges de toutes les catégories : privé et public, fiction et réalité, matériel et immatériel, théorie et pratique…

Le “Bureau des dépositions” est en effet le nom que s’est attribué un groupe d’hommes et de femmes pour rendre compte et désigner l’#œuvre_immatérielle constituée par la #co-présence des #co-auteurs et des co-autrices à un moment donné et en un lieu déterminé. La performance n’est donc pas la représentation d’une œuvre qui préexiste mais bien la réalisation concrète à l’instant-t de l’œuvre dont il est question et dont on pourra par la suite défendre l’#intégrité. Une œuvre qui tend à faire #justice, alors même que les principes brandis par notre pays, clamés haut et fort au titre des gloires nationales, se révèlent insuffisants pour venir en aide concrètement aux migrants. Ici, les migrants sont avant tout des co-auteurs et des co-autrices dont la présence est essentielle à l’intégrité d’une œuvre immatérielle. Le droit d’auteur, le #droit_des_obligations seront ici privilégiés, instruments d’action pour faire valoir non pas la reconnaissance de #droits_fondamentaux à des hommes pressentis nus parce que non élevés au rang de concitoyens mais les droits d’auteurs et d’autrices, inscrits dans des liens d’obligations… Expulser cet auteur, c’est atteindre l’œuvre et entraver sa réalisation et les performances prévues, c’est impliquer les co-auteurs, les co-autrices mais aussi les diverses institutions qui s’impliquent en signant des contrats avec les “#performeurs”.

Ainsi, le Bureau des dépositions n’est pas né d’une interrogation théorique mais d’une urgence pratique et il s’agit alors de ne jamais perdre de vue que la représentation n’est jamais à entendre dans le sens classique d’un spectacle ou d’une performance artistique mais dans le cadre d’une difficulté à résoudre.

La performance par la coprésence est une #action, dans le sens juridique du terme, une action qui relève de la capacité à obtenir justice, de la volonté de faire reconnaître un #droit et non d’un mouvement esthétique sans lendemain. Bien sûr, la démarche suppose, pour être visible, de se fondre dans une mise en scène mais il ne s’agit que d’un moyen et pas d’une fin. Pour ouvrir une scène publique qui a deux vocations : avancer en commun par le partage des problèmes et le recueil de solutions et constituer l’objet même de la démarche juridique : l’œuvre immatérielle.

Être ensemble sur une scène, s’exprimer à la radio… voilà autant de concrétisations qui constituent un cheminement dont nous allons rendre compte, et dans un certaine mesure qui est encore difficile à déterminer, accompagner voire nourrir.

Le premier plateau-radio d’octobre 2019 :


https:// r22.fr/ focus/ oeuvrer-les-limites-du-droit-deuxie me-session

https:// imaj.hypotheses.org/ 2420

#audio

#droit_d'auteur #droit_des_étrangers #asile #migrations #réfugiés

Une initiative de #Sarah_Mekdjian et #Marie_Moreau

ping @karine4 @isskein

Das Dino-Puzzle aus dem 3D-Drucker

SpaceX scheitert mit Rückkehr von Rakete zur Erde

Mit der Wiederverwendung von Trägerraketen will SpaceX-Chef Elon Musk Kosten für Raumfahrtmissionen sparen. Eine nun ins Meer gestürzte Rakete war bereits zum vierten Mal unterwegs und transportierte 60 Mini-Satelliten für ein Hochgeschwindigkeitsinternet ins All.
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